

**DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048)  
Dual interface smart card chip with HAL library, version 2.0**

Security Target Lite

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Version 0.3

## Document History

<b>Change</b>	<b>By</b>
Initial version	Jing Yang
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## 1 ST Introduction

This Security Target (ST) is built upon the Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages [1]. Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informations technik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014.

This chapter presents the ST reference, the reference for the Target of Evaluation (TOE), a TOE overview description and a description of the logical and physical scope of the TOE.

### 1.1. ST identifiers

ST reference:	DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface smart card chips with HAL library, version 2.0 Security Target, 13 December 2016, version 0.3
TOE reference:	DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface smart card chips with HAL library, version 2.0

### 1.2. TOE overview

The DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) TOE is a dual interface smart card chips (80KB EEPROM size for DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080 and 48KB EEPROM size for DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC048) suitable for instance to support a Java Card OS, ID cards, Banking card, etc.

The TOE consists of hardware and IC dedicated software. The hardware is based on a 32-bit CPU with ROM (Non-Volatile Read-Only Memory), EEPROM (Non-volatile Programmable Memory) and RAM (Volatile Memory). The hardware of the TOE also incorporates communication peripherals and cryptographic coprocessors for execution and acceleration of symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. The IC dedicated software contains a library of cryptographic services.

The TOE supports the following communication interfaces:

- ISO/IEC 14443 TYPE A/B contactless interface
- ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface.

The TOE is delivered to a composite product manufacturer. The security IC embedded software is developed by the composite product manufacturer. The security IC embedded software is sent to Datang to be implemented in ROM and delivered back to the composite product manufacturer together with the TOE.

The TOE has been designed to provide a platform for Security IC Embedded Software which ensures that the critical user data of the Composite TOE are stored and processed in a secure way. To this end the TOE has the following security features:

- Hardware coprocessor for TDES
- Hardware coprocessor for AES
- True Random Number Generator

- Hardware for RSA support
- Protection against side channel analysis
- Protection against physical attacks,
- Protection against perturbation attacks,
- *HAL* library with cryptographic services


The above features can be controlled by the Security IC embedded software. The software library in the IC dedicated software has been designed to provide easy access to the hardware functions and to complement these.

### 1.3. TOE description

This section presents the physical and logical scope of the TOE.

#### 1.3.1. Physical scope

A block diagram of the TOE hardware is depicted below.



The hardware of the TOE has the following components:

- ARM SC000 CPU
- 80KB EEPROM for DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080  
48KB EEPROM for DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC048
- 320KB ROM
- 12KB RAM

- ISO/IEC 14443 Type A/B contactless interface
- ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface supports T=0/T=1 protocol
- CRC co-processor
- True Random Number Generator
- Hardware crypto peripherals
  - DES
  - AES
  - Bignum for RSA support
  - SHA-1
  - Domestic algorithms
- Hardware security circuitry
- Detector Circuitry

### 1.3.2 Logical scope

The TOE provides the following Security IC dedicated software, which is used by the Security IC embedded software to perform critical operations.

The Security IC dedicated Support software provides the following security functions:

- TDES cryptographic function
- AES cryptographic function
- RSA cryptographic function
- Random Number Generation

The TOE provides the single DES and SHA-1 algorithms that only support the correctness of the functionality.

The domestic algorithms are existent in the TOE, but these domestic algorithms only support the correctness of the functionality.

### 1.3.3 TOE components

The TOE consists of the following components that are delivered to the composite product manufacturer:

Type	Name	Version	Package
Hardware	DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048)	V2.0	die, module
Software	HAL	V1.0	Software library
Document	Preparative Procedures	V0.1	document
	Operational User Guidance	V0.1	document

## 1.4 Life cycle and delivery

The end-consumer environment of the TOE is phase 7 of the Security IC product life-cycle as defined in the PP [1]. In this phase the TOE is in usage by the end-consumer. Its method of

use now depends on the Security IC Embedded Software. Examples of use cases are ID cards or Bank cards.

The scope of the assurance components referring to the TOE's life cycle is limited to phases 2, 3 and 4. These phases are under the control of the TOE manufacturer. At the end of phase 4 the TOE components described in 1.3.3 are delivered to the Composite Manufacturer.

## 2. Conformance claim

This chapter presents conformance claim and the conformance claim rationale.

### 2.1. CC Conformance

This Security Target and TOE claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria version 3.1:

- Part 1 revision 4 [2].
- Part 2 revision 4 [3]
- Part 3 revision 4 [4]

For the evaluation will be used the methodology in Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology version 3.1 CEM revision 4 [5]

This Security Target and TOE claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.

### 2.2. PP Claim

This Security Target claims **strict** conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile, [1].

The TOE also provides additional functionality, which is not covered in [1].

### 2.3. Package claim

This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package **EAL5** augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2. This assurance level is in line with the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].

### 2.4. Conformance claim rationale

This TOE is equivalent to the conformance claim stated in a Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].

### 3. Security problem definition

This chapter presents the threats, organisational security policies and assumptions for the TOE.

The Assets, Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies are completely taken from the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].

#### 3.1. Description of Assets

Since this Security Target claims conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1], the assets defined in section 3.1 of the Protection Profile are applied.

#### 3.2. Threats

This Security Target claims conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1]. The Threats that apply to this Security Target are defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile. The following table lists the threats of the Protection Profile.

**Table 1 Threats defined in the Protection Profile**

<b>Threat</b>	<b>Title</b>
T.Leak-Inherent	Inherent Information Leakage
T.Phys-Probing	Physical Probing
T.Malfunction	Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Phys-Manipulation	Physical Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced	Forced Information Leakage
T.Abuse-Func	Abuse of Functionality
T.RND	Deficiency of Random Numbers

#### 3.3. Organisational security policies

This Security Target claims conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1]. The Organisational Security Policies that apply to this Security Target are defined in section 3.3 of the Protection Profile, they are:

P.Process-TOE          Protection during TOE Development and Production

The following Organisational Security Policy is also taken from the PP [1] to facilitate the TOE crypto services:

P.Crypto-Service        Cryptographic services of the TOE

### 3.4. Assumptions

This Security Target claims conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1]. The assumptions claimed in this Security Target defined in section 3.4 of the Protection Profile. They are specified below.

**Table 2 Assumptions defined in the Protection Profile**

<b>Assumption</b>	<b>Title</b>
A.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
A.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data

## 4. Security objectives

This chapter provides the statement of security objectives and the security objective rationale. For this chapter the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1] can be applied completely. Only a short overview is given in the following.

### 4.1. Security objectives for the TOE

All objectives described in the section 4.1 of the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1] are claimed for the TOE, these are:

**Table 3 Security objectives for the TOE defined in the Protection Profile**

Security Objective	Title
O.Phys-Manipulation	Protection against Physical Manipulation
O.Phys-Probing	Protection against Physical Probing
O.Malfunction	Protection against Malfunctions
O.Leak-Inherent	Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
O.Leak-Forced	Protection against Forced Information Leakage
O.Abuse-Func	Protection against Abuse of Functionality
O.Identification	TOE Identification
O.RND	Random Numbers

The following additional security objectives are taken from the PP [1] for the provision of hardware based Cryptographic services:

Security Objective	Title
O.TDES	Cryptographic service Triple-DES
O.AES	Cryptographic service AES

In addition the TOE defines the following objectives:

O.RSA      RSA functionality

The TOE shall provide secure cryptographic services implementing the RSA cryptographic algorithm for encryption and decryption.

### 4.2. Security objectives for the security IC embedded software

All security objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software described in section 4.2 of the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1] are claimed for the TOE, these are:

**Table 4 Security Objectives for the security IC embedded software environment defined in the Protection Profile**

Security Objective	Title
OE.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data of the composite TOE

### 4.3. Security objectives for the operational environment

The security objectives for the operational environment that are claimed in this Security Target are all security objectives described in section 4.3 of the “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [1], which are:

Table 5 Security Objectives for the operational environment defined in the Protection Profile

Security Objective	Title
OE.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during composite product manufacturing

### 4.4. Security objectives rationale

Section 4.4 in the Protection Profile provides a rationale how the assumptions, threats and organisational security policies are addressed by the objectives. The table below shows this relationship.

Assumption, Threat or Organisational Security Policy	Security Objective
A.Resp-Appl	OE.Resp-Appl
P.Process-TOE	O.Identification
A.Process-Sec-IC	OE.Process-Sec-IC
T.Leak-Inherent	O.Leak-Inherent
T.Phys-Probing	O.Phys-Probing
T.Malfunction	O.Malfunction
T.Phys-Manipulation	O.Phys-Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced	O.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func	O.Abuse-Func
T.RND	O.RND

For the justification of the above mapping please refer to the Protection Profile.

The table below shows how the additional organisational security policies are addressed by objectives for the TOE.

Assumption, Threat or Organisational Security Policy	Security Objective
P.Crypto-Service	O.TDES O.AES O.RSA

Note that O.TDES and O.AES have been taken from the PP [1]. The others have been added.

## 5. Extended Components Definitions

This Security Target uses the extended security functional requirements defined in chapter 5 of the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].

This Security Target does not define extended components in addition to the Protection Profile.

## 6. Security requirements

This chapter presents the statement of security requirements for the TOE and the security requirements rationale. This chapter applies the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].

### 6.1. Definitions

In the next sections the following notation is used:

- The iteration operation is used when a component is claimed with varying operations, it is denoted by adding “[XXX]” to the component name.
- Refinement, selection or assignment operations are used to add details or assign specific values to components, they are indicated by italic text and explained in footnotes.

### 6.2. Security Functional Requirements (SFR)

To support a better understanding of the combination Security IC Platform Protection Profile vs. Security Target, the TOE Security Functional Requirements are presented in the following several different sections.

#### 6.2.1. SFRs derived from the Security IC Platform Protection Profile

The table below lists the Security Functional Requirements that are directly taken from the Security IC Platform Protection Profile.

Security functional requirement	Title
FRU_FLT.2	“Limited fault tolerance“
FPT_FLS.1	“Failure with preservation of secure state”
FMT_LIM.1	“Limited capabilities”
FMT_LIM.2	“Limited availability”
FAU_SAS.1	“Audit storage”
FPT_PHP.3	“Resistance to physical attack”
FDP_ITT.1	“Basic internal transfer protection”
FDP_IFC.1	“Subset information flow control”
FPT_ITT.1	“Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”
FDP_SDC.1	“Stored data confidentiality”
FDP_SDI.2	“Stored data integrity monitoring and action”
FCS_RNG.1	“Quality metric for random numbers”

Except for FAU\_SAS.1, FDP\_SDC.1, FDP\_SDI.2 and FCS\_RNG.1 all assignment and selection operations are defined in the Protection Profile.

- In FAU\_SAS.1 the left open assignment is the type of persistent memory;
- In FDP\_SDC.1 the left open assignment is the memory area;
- In FDP\_SDI.2 the left open assignments are the user data attributes and the action to be taken;

- In the FCS\_RNG.1 the left open definition is the quality metric for the random numbers.

The following statements define these completed SFRs.

**FAU\_SAS.1**                      Audit storage  
 Hierarchical to:                No other components.  
 FAU\_SAS.1.1                    The TSF shall provide *the test process before TOE Delivery*<sup>1</sup> with the capability to store *the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data and/or supplements of the security IC embedded software*<sup>2</sup> in the *EEPROM*<sup>3</sup>.  
 Dependencies:                    No dependencies.

**FDP\_SDC.1**                      Stored data confidentiality  
 Hierarchical to:                No other components.  
 FDP\_SDC.1.1                    The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it is stored in the *EEPROM, ROM and RAM*<sup>4</sup>.  
 Dependencies:                    No dependencies.

**FDP\_SDI.2**                      Stored data integrity monitoring and action  
 Hierarchical to:                FDP\_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring  
 FDP\_SDI.2.1                    The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for *integrity errors*<sup>5</sup> on all objects, based on the following attributes: *parity bits*<sup>6</sup>.  
 FDP\_SDI.2.2                    Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall *reset*<sup>7</sup> or *interrupt*<sup>8</sup>.  
 Dependencies:                    No dependencies.

**FCS\_RNG.1 [PTG.2]**Random number generation  
 Hierarchical to:                No other components.  
 FCS\_RNG.1.1 [PTG.2]The TSF shall provide a *physical* random number generator that Implements:  

- A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.
- If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the *RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source*<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> [assignment: list of subjects]

<sup>2</sup> [assignment: list of audit information]

<sup>3</sup> [assignment: type of persistent memory]

<sup>4</sup> [assignment: memory area]

<sup>5</sup> [assignment: integrity errors]

<sup>6</sup> [assignment: user data attributes]

<sup>7</sup> [assignment: action to be taken]

<sup>8</sup> [assignment: action to be taken]

<sup>9</sup> [selection: prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source, generates the internal random numbers with a

- The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.
- The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon.
- The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is triggered *continuously*<sup>10</sup>. The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time

FCS\_RNG.1.2[PTG.2]The TSF shall provide *32 bit random number words*<sup>11</sup> that meet:

- test procedure A *and no other test suites*<sup>12</sup> does not distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.
- The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FPT\_FLS.1** Failure with preservation of secure state

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur<sup>13</sup>.

Application note: The occurred failures will cause the alarm signals to be triggered, which will result in a reset (secure state).

**FPT\_PHP.3** Resistance to physical attack

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing<sup>14</sup> to the TSF<sup>15</sup> by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

Application note: If a physical manipulation or physical probing attack is detected, an alarm will be automatically triggered by the hardware, which will cause the chip to be reset.

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post-processing algorithm of class DRG.2 as long as its internal state entropy guarantees the claimed output entropy].

<sup>10</sup> [selection: externally, at regular intervals, continuously, applied upon specified internal events].

<sup>11</sup> [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]]

<sup>12</sup> [assignment: additional standard test suites]

<sup>13</sup> [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]

<sup>14</sup> [assignment: physical tampering scenarios]

<sup>15</sup> [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]

## 6.2.2. SFRs regarding cryptographic functionality

### FCS\_COP.1 [TDES] Cryptographic operation - TDES

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 [TDES] The TSF shall perform *encryption and decryption*<sup>16</sup> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *TDES in ECB and CBC mode*<sup>17</sup> and cryptographic key sizes of *168 bit*<sup>18</sup> that meet the following *NIST SP800-67*[8], *NIST SP800-38A*<sup>19</sup>[9].

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**Application note:** The TOE also supports single DES. However the security of the single DES algorithm is not resistant against attacks with a high attack potential. Therefore the application of single DES shall not be used in parts of the Security Embedded Software that require high security.

### FCS\_COP.1 [AES] Cryptographic operation – AES

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 [AES] The TSF shall perform *encryption and decryption*<sup>20</sup> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *AES in ECB*<sup>21</sup> and cryptographic key sizes of *128 bit, 192 bit, 256 bit*<sup>22</sup> that meet the following *FIPS 197*[10], *NIST SP800-38A*<sup>23</sup>[9].

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

### FCS\_COP.1 [RSA] Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 [RSA] The TSF shall perform *encryption and decryption*<sup>24</sup> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) in CRT and straightforward mode*<sup>25</sup> and cryptographic key sizes of *96 bit to 2048 bit*<sup>26</sup> (with a step size of 32 bit) that meet the following *PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June 14, 2002*<sup>27</sup>.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or

<sup>16</sup> [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]

<sup>17</sup> [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]

<sup>18</sup> [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

<sup>19</sup> [assignment: list of standards]

<sup>20</sup> [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]

<sup>21</sup> [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]

<sup>22</sup> [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

<sup>23</sup> [assignment: list of standards]

<sup>24</sup> [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]

<sup>25</sup> [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]

<sup>26</sup> [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

<sup>27</sup> [assignment: list of standards]

FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
 FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

### 6.3. Security Assurance Requirements (SAR)

The Security Assurance Requirements claimed for the TOE are the SARs claimed in section 6.2 of the Security IC Protection Profile [1].

This Security Target will be evaluated according to Security Target evaluation (Class ASE)

The Security Assurance Requirements for the evaluation of the TOE are the components in Assurance Evaluation level EAL5 augmented by the components ALC\_DVS.2 and AVA\_VAN.5. The table below shows the details of these assurance requirements.

Table 6 TOE assurance requirements

Security assurance requirements	Titles
Class ADV: Development	
ADV_ARC.1	Architectural design
ADV_FSP.5	Functional specification
ADV_IMP.1	Implementation representation
ADV_INT.2	TSF Internals
ADV_TDS.4	TOE design
Class AGD: Guidance documents	
AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1	Preparative user guidance
Class ALC: Life-cycle support	
ALC_CMC.4	CM capabilities
ALC_CMS.5	CM scope
ALC_DEL.1	Delivery
ALC_DVS.2	Development security
ALC_LCD.1	Life-cycle definition
ALC_TAT.2	Tools and techniques
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	
ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
Class ATE: Tests	
ATE_COV.2	Coverage
ATE_DPT.3	Depth
ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing
ATE_IND.2	Independent testing
Class AVA: Vulnerability analysis	

AVA_VAN.5	Vulnerability analysis
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## 6.4. Security requirements rationale

### 6.4.1. Security Functional Requirements (SFR)

The table below provides an overview of how the security functional requirements are combined to meet the security objectives.

Security Objectives for the TOE	Security Functional Requirements	Fulfilment of mapping
O.Leak-Inherent	FDP_ITT.1 FPT_ITT.1 FDP_IFC.1	FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection” FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection” FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”
O.Phys-Probing	FDP_SDC.1 FPT_PHP.3	FDP_SDC.1 “Stored data confidentiality” FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Malfunction	FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1	FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
O.Phys-Manipulation	FDP_SDI.2 FPT_PHP.3	FDP_SDI.2 “Stored data integrity monitoring and action” FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Leak-Forced	FDP_ITT.1 FPT_ITT.1 FDP_IFC.1 FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 FPT_PHP.3	FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection” FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection” FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control” FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state” FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Abuse-Func	FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 FDP_ITT.1 FPT_ITT.1 FDP_IFC.1 FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 FPT_PHP.3	FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities” FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability” FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection” FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection” FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control” FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”

		FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Identification	FAU_SAS.1	FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”
O.RND	FCS_RNG.1 FDP_ITT.1 FPT_ITT.1 FDP_IFC.1 FPT_PHP.3 FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1	FCS_RNG.1 “Quality metric for random numbers” FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection” FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection” FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control” FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack” FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance” FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
O.DES	FCS_COP.1 [TDES]	O.DES requires the TOE to support DES encryption and decryption with its specified key lengths. The claim for FCS_COP.1 [TDES] is suitable to meet the objective O.DES.
O.RSA	FCS_COP.1 [RSA]	O.RSA requires the TOE to support RSA encryption and decryption with its specified key lengths. The claim for FCS_COP.1 [RSA] is suitable to meet the objective O. RSA.
O.AES	FCS_COP.1 [AES]	O.AES requires the TOE to support AES encryption and decryption with its specified key lengths. The claim for FCS_COP.1 [AES] is suitable to meet the objective O.AES.
OE.Process-Sec-IC		
OE.Plat-Appl		
OE.Resp-Appl		
Security Objectives for the TOE	Dependencies	Fulfilment of dependencies, see next paragraph

#### 6.4.2. Dependencies of the SFRs

The dependencies for the SFRs claimed according to the Protection Profile are all satisfied in the set of SFRs claimed in the Protection Profile.

In the following table the dependencies of the SFRs claimed in addition to Protection Profile is indicated.

Security functional requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by security requirements in this Security Target
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FCS_COP.1 [TDES]	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4	See explanation below this table
FCS_COP.1 [AES]	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4	See explanation below this table
FCS_COP.1 [RSA]	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4	See explanation below this table

The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure that the implemented additional security functional requirements FCS\_COP.1 [TDES], FCS\_COP.1 [AES] and FCS\_COP.1 [RSA] are used as specified and that the User Data processed by the related security functionality is protected as defined for the application context.

The dependent requirements for FCS\_COP.1 [TDES], FCS\_COP.1 [AES] and FCS\_COP.1 [RSA] address the appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified cryptographic function. All requirements concerning these management functions shall be fulfilled by the environment (Security IC Embedded Software).

The functional requirements [FDP\_ITC.1, or FDP\_ITC.2 or FCS\_CKM.1] and FCS\_CKM.4 are not included in this Security Target since the TOE only provides a pure engine for encryption and decryption without additional features for the handling of cryptographic keys. Therefore the Security IC Embedded Software must fulfil these requirements related to the needs of the realised application.

### 6.4.3. Security Assurance Requirements (SAR)

The SARs as defined in section 6.3 are in line with the SARs in the Security IC Platform Protection Profile. The context of this ST is equivalent to the context described in the Protection Profile and therefore these SARs are also applicable for this ST.

## 7. TOE summary specification

This chapter provides general information to potential users of the TOE on how the TOE implements the Security Functional Requirements in terms of “Security Functionality”.

### 7.1. Malfunction

Malfunctioning relates to the security functional requirements FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1. The TOE meets these SFRs by a group of security measures that guarantee correct operation of the TOE.

The TOE ensures its correct operation and prevents any malfunction while the security IC embedded software is executed by implementation of the following security features:

- Environmental detectors  
monitor if environmental conditions are within the specified range

### 7.2. Leakage

Leakages relate to the security functional requirements FDP\_ITT.1, FDP\_IFC.1 and FPT\_ITT.1. The TOE meets these SFRs by implementing several measures that provide logical protection against leakage:

- Memory encryption and bus masking

### 7.3. Physical manipulation and probing

Physical manipulation and probing relates to the security functional requirements FPT\_PHP.3, FDP\_SDC.1 and FDP\_SDI.1. The TOE meets this SFR by implementing security measures that provides physical protection against physical probing and manipulation.

The security measures protect the TOE against manipulation of

- (i) the hardware,
- (ii) the security IC embedded software in the ROM and the EEPROM,
- (iii) the application data in the EEPROM and RAM including the configuration data.

It also protects User Data or TSF data against disclosure by physical probing when stored or while being processed by the TOE.

The protection of the TOE comprises different features within the design and construction, which make reverse-engineering and tamper attacks more difficult. The following security measures protect the TOE against physical manipulation and probing:

- Active shield  
Protecting hardware features by dedicated physical protection techniques.
- Data integrity checking  
Verify the integrity of the data in memory during reading and writing.
- Memory encryption and bus masking

No plain text on the bus and memory.

#### 7.4. Abuse of functionality and Identification

Abuse of functionality and Identification relates to the security functional requirements FMT\_LIM.1, FMT\_LIM.2 and FAU\_SAS.1. The TOE meets these SFRs by implementation of a test mode access control mechanism that prevents abuse of test functionality delivered as part of the TOE.

The test functionality is not available to the user after delivery of the TOE to the Composite Manufacturer. The TOE has implemented a hardware fuse mechanism to prevent using this functionality after TOE delivery.

#### 7.5. Random numbers

Random numbers relate to the security requirement FCS\_RNG.1. The TOE meets this SFR by providing a random number generator.

The random number generator fulfils the requirements of AIS31 class PTG.2[12].

On-line test circuit is implemented by hardware to check the quality of the raw random number sequence.

#### 7.6. Cryptographic functionality

The TOE provides the single and Triple-DES algorithm according to the NIST SP800-67[8] and NIST SP800-38A [9] standard to meet the security requirement FCS\_COP.1[TDES]. The TOE implements the Triple-DES algorithm by means of a combination of hardware co-processor and IC dedicated support software. It supports the DES algorithm with a single 56 bit key supporting both CBC and ECB mode. It supports the Triple-DES algorithm with three 56bit keys (168 bit) for the 3-key Triple-DES supporting both CBC and ECB mode. The keys for the DES algorithms shall be provided by the security IC embedded software.

The TOE provides the AES algorithm according to the NIST SP800-67[8], FIPS 197[10] and NIST SP800-38A [9] standard to meet the security requirement FCS\_COP.1[AES]. The TOE implements the AES algorithm by means of a combination of hardware co-processor and IC dedicated support software. It supports the AES algorithm with 128 bit, 192 bit and 256 bit key supporting ECB mode. The keys for the AES algorithms shall be provided by the security IC embedded software.

The TOE provides the RSA algorithm according to a specified cryptographic algorithm Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) to meet the security requirement FCS\_COP.1[RSA]. It supports the RSA algorithm with key sizes from 96 bit to 2048 bit key supporting both CRT and straightforward mode. The keys for the RSA algorithms shall be provided by the security IC embedded software.

## 8. References

Ref	Title	Version	Date
[1]	Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014	Version 1.0	13.01.2014
[2]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model CCMB-2012-09-001	Version 3.1 Revision 4	September 2012
[3]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements CCMB-2012-09-002	Version 3.1 Revision 4	September 2012
[4]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements CCMB-2012-09-003	Version 3.1 Revision 4	September 2012
[5]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology CCMB-2012-09-004	Version 3.1 Revision 4	September 2012
[6]	NIST Special Publication 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, January 2012		January 2012
[7]	NIST DRAFT Special Publication 800-90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, August 2012		August 2012
[8]	NIST SP 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, revised January 2012, National Institute of Standards and Technology		January 2012
[9]	NIST SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, 2001, with Addendum Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode, October 2010		October 2010
[10]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, November 26, 2001		November 2001
[11]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4 SECURE HASH STANDARD U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011 February, 11		February 2011
[12]	A proposal for functionality classes of random number generators, 2011		18.09.2011